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Abstract	
Since	mid‐1980s	crime	rates	in	Brazil	started	to	increase	with	the	transition	from	military	
dictatorship	to	democracy,	a	period	marked	by	the	rise	of	poverty	and	hyperinflation.	Given	
levels	of	police	 corruption	and	protection	of	 criminal	gangs,	 trust	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system	 was	 low,	 leading	 to	 a	 heightened	 dependence	 on	 private	 security,	 gated	
communities	and	the	politicisation	of	law	and	order	politics.	An	impressive	punitive	turn	
began	at	in	the	1990s.	This	paper	analysed	penal	policies	under	successive	left‐wing	Lula	
and	Dilma	governments	from	2003	to	2014.	During	this	period	the	rise	of	‘postneoliberal’	
and	 ‘postneoconservative’	 politics,	 led	 by	 the	 Workers	 Party,	 developed	 governmental	
strategies	and	initiatives	that	formulated	and	legitimized	rich	and	complex	expressions	of	
traditionally	 left‐wing	 politics.	 Despite	 the	 simultaneous	 implementation	 of	 distributive	
policies,	the	increase	of	human	development	levels	throughout	the	country,	the	reduction	
of	 social	 inequalities	and	 the	redirection	of	 the	official	discourse	of	Federal	Government	
security	policies	towards	crime	prevention,	incarceration	rates	continued	to	increase.	This	
article	 examines	 why	 efforts	 to	 build	 an	 effective	 public	 security	 policy	 committed	 to	
upholding	civil	rights	and	improving	the	control	of	police	and	police	activities	have	failed.	
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The	response	to	crime	in	the	postneoliberal	context	
Since	 the	beginning	of	 the	1990s,	violence,	 insecurity	and	criminality	have	been	key	 issues	 in	
large‐	and	medium‐sized	urban	centres	in	South	America.	In	the	case	of	Brazil,	homicide	rates	
have	increased	since	the	start	of	the	1980s	to	an	average	of	50,000	deaths	per	year	and,	in	the	
first	years	of	 the	new	millennium,	 to	approximately	25	homicides	per	100,000	 inhabitants.	 In	
some	State	capitals	rates	even	grew	to	90	homicides	per	100,000	inhabitants.	After	a	decrease	
between	2003	and	2007,	the	homicide	curve	again	began	to	climb	in	Brazil,	reaching	a	total	of	
56,337	deaths	by	homicide	in	2012,	with	a	rate	of	29	deaths	per	100,000	inhabitants	(Waiselfisz	
2014).	The	vast	majority	of	victims	comes	from	a	lower	class	background;	has	received	low	level	
schooling;	is	young,	male	and	black;	and	often	lives	in	the	outskirts	of	a	large	urban	center.	Crime	
rates	started	to	increase	with	the	transition	from	military	dictatorship	to	democracy	in	the	mid‐
1980s,	 which	 period	 was	 marked	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 poverty	 and	 hyperinflation.	 The	 return	 of	
democracy	brought	with	it	an	unprecedented	intensification	of	crime.	
	
The	following	Figure	1	represents	the	homicide	rates	in	Brazil	from	1980	to	2012.	A	growth	trend	
can	be	identified	from	11	homicides	per	100,000	in	1980	to	29	homicides	per	100,000	inhabitants	
by	2012.3	A	downward	trend	and	stabilisation	can	be	perceived	from	2003	onward,	when	some	
important	States	 like	São	Paulo	and	Rio	de	 Janeiro	experienced	a	significant	drop	in	homicide	
rates.	 This	 did	 not	 have	 a	 wider	 impact	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 southern	 and	 north‐eastern	 States	
experiencing	increasing	rates	in	the	same	period.	However,	from	that	time	onward,	a	clear	shift	
in	the	homicide	curve	can	be	noted.	This	has	been	attributed	by	researchers	to	changes	in	policies	
and	social	dynamics,	one	of	which	was	the	implementation	of	the	Statute	of	Disarmament,	which	
established	an	effective	arms	control	policy	and	a	ban	on	the	carrying	of	weapons	by	the	civilian	
population,	as	well	as	the	consolidation	of	the	criminal	group	‘del	Primer	Comando	de	la	Capital’	
(PCC)	in	São	Paulo.	PCC	emerged	in	prisons	and	had	a	monopoly	on	the	illegal	drug	trade.	The	
policy	thus	contributed	to	the	reduction	of	homicides	caused	by	disputes	over	territory.4	The	year	
2012	was	marked	by	a	new	record	in	homicides,	reaching	the	highest	level	since	the	start	of	the	
measurement	of	statistics.	
	
	
Figure	1:	Homicide	rates	in	Brazil	(per	100,000	inhabitants)	1980‐2012	
Source:	Waiselfisz	(2014)	
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This	objective	component	is	accompanied	by	a	 ‘subjective’	component,	or	 ‘sense	of	insecurity’,	
which	can	be	understood	as	a	change	in	expectations	and	feelings	of	the	inhabitants	of	large‐	and	
medium‐sized	cities	in	relation	to	the	possibility	of	becoming	a	crime	victim.	This	unease,	in	turn,	
is	 expressed	by	 innumerable	self‐protection	and	avoidance	 tactics,	which	have	a	 considerable	
impact	on	behaviour	in	everyday	life	and	constitutes	a	new	component	of	the	insecurity	crisis.		
	
These	objective	and	subjective	components	of	the	insecurity	crisis	have	become	recurring	themes	
in	news	and	media	debates,	to	the	point	that	they	have	now	become	one	of	the	fundamental	forms	
of	 sense‐making	 by	 the	media.	 Additionally,	 it	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 State	 failure	 by	 Brazil’s	
surrounding	countries,	due	to	the	fact	that	security	policies	and	criminal	justice	are	traditionally	
arranged	by	State‐level	governance	(police,	judiciary	and	the	penitentiary	system).	As	a	result,	
even	beyond	the	growth	of	insecurity,	there	has	been	a	growing	‘politicization’	of	the	issue,	which	
increasingly	means	that	the	‘political’	arms	of	State	structures	are	seen	as	part	of	the	problem,	or	
as	the	one	that,	together	with	experts	(for	example,	lawyers	and	criminologists),	must	make	key	
decisions	that	act	in	the	area,	while	moving	the	administrative	part	to	a	secondary	position.		
	
Although	many	argue	that	something	has	to	be	done	about	crime,	the	trust	in	the	criminal	justice	
system	remains	very	low.	It	is	viewed	as	slow,	ineffective	and	biased	in	favour	of	the	wealthy	and	
powerful.5	Brazilians	therefore	rarely	 involve	the	justice	system	in	dealing	with	their	conflicts	
but,	instead,	rely	on	their	existing	interpersonal	networks	to	resolve	issues.	One	consequence	is	
that	 the	middle‐	and	upper‐classes	 isolate	 themselves	by	moving	 into	closed	compounds	with	
electric	gates,	walls	and	private	security.	This	 is	 reflected	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	private	security	
industry	employs	more	people	than	the	public	security	system	in	Brazil.	In	several	regions	of	the	
country	it	is	not	unusual	to	hire	a	professional	hitman	in	order	to	eliminate	political	opponents	
or	suspected	assailants.	Additionally,	in	recent	years	urban	‘militias’	emerged	in	the	favelas	of	Rio	
de	Janeiro.	These	militias	are	controlled	by	the	police	and	charge	residents	money	in	exchange	
for	protection	of	the	community	from	drug	traffickers	and	other	assaults.	
	
Efforts	to	build	a	public	security	policy	committed	to	guarantee	civil	rights	and	improvement	of	
the	control	of	police	and	police	activities	have	failed	since	the	1980s.	This	occurred	because	they	
were	blocked	by	the	ruling	punitive	populism	at	the	time	and	the	inability	of	the	government	to	
confront	often	corrupt	and	violent	resistance	by	corporate	police	structures.	During	the	military	
dictatorship,	 political	 murders	 were	 secret	 acts	 by	 the	 government	 that	 were	 never	 publicly	
admitted.	 Under	 popularly	 elected	 governments,	 homicides	 committed	 by	 the	 police	 during	
violent	and	unprofessional	raids	in	the	urban	periphery	–	ones	that	often	remained	unpunished	
–	gained	popular	support.	This	was	with	the	apparent	aim	of	controlling	crime	within	a	situation	
where	there	was	no	trust	in	the	justice	system.	In	practice,	however,	they	served	as	a	currency	
agreement	between	the	police	and	trafficking	groups,	characterizing	what	Misse	(2008)	termed	
‘political	goods’.	
	
Due	to	the	growing	perception	of	a	public	security	crisis,	the	Federal	Government	was	forced	in	
the	mid‐1990s	to	assume	a	stronger	leadership	role	in	the	development	and	induction	of	security	
policies	in	the	States.	It	did	so	by	creating	the	National	Secretariat	of	Public	Safety	(in	1996)	and	
the	National	Public	Security	Fund	(in	2001),	and	by	publishing	successive	national	plans	on	public	
safety.	 These	 policies	were	 initiated	 during	 the	 first	 governing	 period	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Social	
Democracy	 Party	 (PSDB)	 that	was	 led	 by	 Fernando	Henrique	 Cardoso,	who	 governed	with	 a	
coalition	of	center‐right	parties.	The	policies	were	deepened	by	the	governments	of	Luis	Inacio	
Lula	da	Silva	of	the	Partido	dos	Trabalhadores	(Workers	Party),	the	head	of	a	center‐left	coalition.	
It	 is	 possible	 to	 link	 the	 growing	 leadership	 of	 the	 Federal	 Government	 with	 the	 rise	 of	
‘postneoliberal’	and	 ‘postneoconservative’	politics	which,	 led	by	the	Workers	Party,	developed	
governmental	 strategies	 and	 initiatives	 that	 formulated	 and	 legitimized	 rich	 and	 complex	
expressions	of	traditionally	left‐wing	politics.		
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Despite	the	complexity	of	a	political	system	that	is	made	up	out	of	30	parties	and	that	depends	on	
the	construction	of	coalitions	 in	a	 rather	heterogeneous	parliament	that	often	 is	based	on	the	
exchange	of	political	favours	and	patronage,	the	fact	remains	that,	since	the	stabilization	of	the	
currency	 due	 to	 the	 ‘Real	 Plan’	 (Plano	 Real)	 in	 1995,	 there	 was	 a	 steady	 growth	 of	 social	
expenditures	by	the	Federal	Government.	Between	1995	and	2010	the	federal	social	expenditure	
more	than	doubled,	from	234	million	Reales	in	1995	to	638	million	in	2010,	an	increase	of	172	
per	 cent	 over	 16	 years.	 In	 relation	 to	 the	 country’s	 Gross	 Domestic	 Product,	 state	 social	
expenditure	increased	from	11.24	per	cent	in	1995	to	15.54	per	cent	in	2010	(Castro	2012).	
	
During	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso’s	first	term	(1995‐1998),	the	Gini	index	of	income	inequality	
(where	0	 corresponds	with	perfect	 equality	 and	1	with	perfect	 inequality)	 remained	virtually	
unchanged,	and	then	fell	slightly	from	early	on	in	his	second	term	(1998‐2002)	to	reach	0.594	in	
2002	(Figure	2).	A	considerable	decrease	can	be	noted	during	the	governmental	period	ruled	by	
Lula	(2003‐2010)	reaching	0.533	by	the	end	of	his	second	term.	This	decrease	continued	during	
the	government	of	President	Dilma	Rousseff,	who	succeeded	Lula	in	2011,	reaching	the	lowest	
outcome	measured	in	the	last	decades	in	2012	when	the	index	dropped	to	0.526.	
	
		
Figure	2:	Movement	 in	 income	 inequality	 in	Brazil	(Gini	 index	of	average	household	 income	per	
capita),	1995‐2012		
Source:	PNAD	
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Criminal	policy	and	legal	reforms	
To	 analyse	 the	movements	 of	 criminal	 policy	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 incarceration	 rates	 in	 Brazil	
involves	addressing	the	complexity	of	crime	control.	The	governmental	organs	that	act	within	this	
field	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 Federal	 Executive	 power	 (Ministry	 of	 Justice,	 Federal	 Police),	 the	
Executive’s	state	powers	(civil	and	military	police,	prison	administration),	the	Federal	Judiciary	
(Supreme	Court,	High	Court	and	Federal	Court),	State	executive	powers	(State	Administrations	of	
Justice),	and	the	Federal	Legislature	(National	Congress	–	Chamber	of	Deputies	and	Senate).	
	
The	National	Congress	has	the	sole	power	to	legislate	in	criminal	matters	in	Brazil.	The	Congress,	
however,	does	not	have	the	autonomy	to	define	criminalized	behaviour	beyond	what	has	been	
established	by	federal	law;	nor	is	it	able	to	create	procedural	rules.	It	is	important	to	note	that	
one	 of	 the	 characteristics	 that	marks	 the	Brazilian	post‐dictatorial	 political	 system,	 especially	
after	the	end	of	the	Collor	de	Mello	government	 in	1992,	 is	the	consolidation	of	a	presidential	
system	based	on	the	development	of	coalitions.	These	coalitions	are	made	up	of	parties	that	exist	
in	 the	 broad	 political	 landscape	 and	 need	 to	 create	 partnerships	 that	 reflect	 the	 majority	 in	
parliament.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 governmental	 system	 adopted	 is	 ‘presidentialism’,	 in	 which	
governments	resort	to	coalitions	in	order	to	garner	support	for	their	initiatives	(Limongi	2006).	
In	fact,	this	 is	the	modus	operandi	of	most	contemporary	democracies.	In	this	system	minority	
governments	face	serious	governance	issues,	while	governments	with	majority	coalitions	are	able	
to	mitigate	such	difficulties.	In	Brazil,	the	coalitions	in	this	sense	act	as	a	basic	operating	budget	
of	functioning	presidentialism,	in	which	the	government	is	more	successful	adopting	legislation	
when	it	can	consistently	count	on	the	support	of	a	broad	coalition	of	parties.	Therefore,	members	
of	the	parties	that	are	part	of	the	coalition	supporting	the	president	generally	follow	the	vote	of	
the	government’s	leader	(Limongi	2006).	
	
Based	on	empirical	studies	Limongi	(2006)	showed	that	the	Lula	government,	in	his	first	term,	
received	an	average	support	of	89.1	per	cent	of	164	votes	 from	the	deputies	of	 its	supporting	
parties,	thus	ensuring	the	maintenance	of	governance	(Limongi	2006).	In	addition,	it	appears	that	
the	losses	are	not	the	result	of	indiscipline	of	the	parliamentary	base	of	support,	but	rather	its	
internal	division.	In	other	words,	losses	occurred	in	situations	in	which	at	least	one	party	did	not	
follow	the	direction	of	the	government	leader	(Limongi	2006).	
	
It	thus	becomes	evident	that	whether	proposals	of	the	Executive	Power	become	successful	is	not	
the	 result	 of	 case‐by‐case	 negotiations.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 government	 to	 control	
legislative	production,	which	 in	 turn	 is	based	on	 the	 interaction	between	 the	Executive	of	 the	
party	 in	power	 to	produce	an	agenda	whilst	maintaining	majority	support	(Limongi	2006).	 In	
other	words,	because	the	process	of	legislative	decision	favours	the	Executive	Power,	objections	
of	 the	 Congress	 become	 more	 predictable.	 In	 order	 to	 structure	 and	 preserve	 support,	 it	 is	
important	to	focus	on	plenary	debates	that	will	most	likely	be	accepted	and	avoid	those	that	might	
present	a	risk	to	the	coalition	(Limongi	2006).	
	
General	research	in	terms	of	legal	reforms	in	the	area	of	criminal	justice	has	pointed	towards	the	
existence	of	a	hypertrophy	or	 inflation	 in	criminal	rules,	which	 invade	areas	of	social	 life	 that	
previously	 were	 not	 covered	 by	 criminal	 sanctions.	 It	 is	 a	 criminal	 remedy	 used	 by	 political	
decision‐makers	 in	 response	 to	 almost	 all	 types	 of	 conflicts	 and	 social	 problems.	 The	 penal	
response	 is	 the	 symbolic	 response	 by	 the	 state	 to	 the	 growing	 demands	 of	 security	 and	
punishment	by	society,	which	are	expressed	by	the	media.	However,	the	response	occurs	without	
measuring	 its	 instrumental	 effectiveness	 as	 a	 means	 of	 reducing	 crime,	 or	 forecasting	 the	
potential	direct	 impact	on	 the	prison	system,	or	assessing	any	other	possible	side‐effects	 that	
might	result	from	the	use	of	force.		
	
As	for	the	coordination	of	public	security	legislation	in	the	country,	the	landscape	in	Brazil	was	
marked	by	a	rigid	division	of	powers,	in	which	States	were	granted	great	autonomy	in	designing	
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and	implementing	their	own	policies	and	initiatives.	According	to	Sá	e	Silva	(2012),	the	Federal	
Government	action	was	summed	up	by	the	mobilization	of	the	Federal	Police	(responsible	for	the	
investigation	of	crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Federal	Court)	and	the	Federal	Transit	Police.	
The	second	notable	characteristic	was	the	centrality	of	extensive	action	of	the	State	Police,	backed	
–	or,	rather,	ignored	–	by	the	Federal	Government.	
	
The	 political	 landscape	 starts	 to	 change	 with	 the	 start	 of	 the	 Fernando	 Henrique	 Cardoso	
government	 (1995‐2002).	 The	 National	 Secretariat	 of	 Public	 Security	 (SENASP)	 was	 created	
under	the	Ministry	of	Justice	and	launched	the	first	National	Plan	of	Public	Security	in	2000.	In	
addition	 the	National	Public	 Security	Fund	 (FNSP)	was	 formed,	which	allowed	greater	power	
induction	and	ensured	systematic	initiatives	in	the	Federal	Government	sector.	
	
The	National	Public	Security	Plans	during	the	Lula‐	(2003‐2010)	and	Dilma	Governments	
(2011‐2014)6	
After	three	previous	attempts	(in	1989,	1994	and	1998),	Luiz	Inacio	Lula	da	Silva	was	elected	
President	of	the	Republic	in	2002.	With	a	career	built	on	the	union	struggle	in	the	1970s,	which	
culminated	in	the	founding	of	the	Workers	Party	in	the	early	1980s,	Lula	became	president	in	a	
coalition	that	united	the	parties	of	the	so‐called	democratic	and	popular	bloc.	The	coalition	was	
mainly	 comprised	of	 the	Brazilian	Socialist	Party	and	 the	Communist	Party	of	Brazil	 and	was	
located	to	the	left	of	the	national	political	spectrum.	These	parties	prioritised	the	formation	of	a	
coalition	that	aimed	to	implement	policies	to	combat	poverty	and	to	reduce	the	huge	social	and	
regional	 inequalities.	 In	 addition	 it	 increased	 social	 spending,	 implemented	 state‐organised	
income	 distribution,	 and	 directed	 international	 policy	 towards	 greater	 autonomy	 while	
prioritising	stronger	relationships	with	Latin	American	countries	and	other	so‐called	emerging	
countries.	 These	 elements	 influenced	 the	 government	 to	 be	 considered	 left‐wing.	 This	
characteristic	was	not	substantially	altered	despite	the	broadening	of	partnerships	in	terms	of	
the	Congress,	which	resulted	in	further	ambiguities	and	difficulty	to	implement	more	profound	
reforms.		
	
Not	coincidentally,	public	safety	was	one	of	the	priorities	identified	in	the	electoral	process,	with	
a	focus	on	a	greater	role	for	the	Federal	Government	in	reducing	violence.	Lula	had	gone	through	
the	experience	of	governing	some	important	States	before	his	victory	in	the	presidential	elections,	
and	had	faced	difficulties	in	managing	the	police	apparatus,	particularly	in	Rio	Grande	do	Sul.	This	
was	due	to	left‐wing	programmatic	weaknesses	on	the	issue	of	security	and	to	the	boycott	of	the	
police	 forces	 by	 important	 sectors	 that	 were	 committed	 to	 the	 defence	 of	 human	 rights	 and	
historical	allies	of	social	movements.	Lula	therefore	proposed	a	National	Plan	of	Public	Security	
during	his	electoral	candidacy,	in	which	the	following	was	specifically	expressed:		
	
The	Brazilian	people	are	dominated	by	a	general	feeling	of	insecurity	and,	for	that	
reason,	 our	 government	 will	 seek	 to	 establish	 a	 Public	 Security	 System	 on	 a	
national	level.	Social	exclusion,	with	unemployment	as	its	main	expression,	affects	
millions	of	men	and	women	and	results	 in	daily	despair	 for	many	people,	 if	not	
crime.	 The	 statistics	 show	 that	 firearms	 as	 the	 causa	mortis	 of	 youth.	 And	 the	
impunity	 with	which	 organized	 crime	 acts,	 threatens	 to	 compromise	 the	 often	
infiltrated	 functioning	 of	 democratic	 institutions.	 The	 same	 impunity	 can	 be	
observed	in	the	hundreds	of	crimes	committed	against	rural	workers,	unionists,	
lawyers	and	religious	people	who	fight	for	the	Agrarian	Reform.	(Workers	Party	
2002)	
	
It	became	clear	that	the	commitment	to	arms	control	policy	was	inherently	related	to	the	
fight	 against	 the	 impunity	 of	 crimes	 committed	 by	 criminal	 organizations	 who	 were	
opposed	to	social	movements	and	human	rights.	The	plan	also	recognized	that:	
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The	lack	of	human	and	material	preparation	of	the	police	apparatus	and	the	slow	
judicial	system	encourage	violence	and	aggravate	crime,	which	in	turn	reproduces	
itself	and	broadens	due	to	the	absurd	prison	system.	The	impunity	of	the	powerful	
and	brutal	misery	of	much	of	the	population,	which	is	in	stark	contrast	with	the	
continued	 appeal	 of	 consumerism,	 causes	 a	 crisis	 of	 moral	 values	 that	 fuels	
violence.	Both	the	rich	and	poor	are	frightened	and	locked	in	their	neighborhoods	
and	homes.	Forms	of	sociability	for	Brazilians	becomes	increasingly	restricted.	The	
poor	 are	 stigmatized	 as	 criminals	 and	 civil	 coexistence	 is	 threatened.	 The	
organizations	 responsible	 for	 national	 defense	 are	 put	 to	 the	 test	 by	 the	
increasingly	more	insolent	acts	by	organized	crime.	(Workers	Party	2002)	
	
Therefore,	 the	National	Public	 Security	Plan	 encouraged,	on	 the	one	hand,	 social	policies	 that	
allowed	for	the	reduction	of	inequality	and	contributed	to	social	appeasement	and,	on	the	other	
hand,	improved	the	performance	of	public	security	organs,	in	particular	that	of	the	Federal	Police	
but	also	of	the	State	Police.	The	policies	would	be	carried	out	with	the	use	of	new	technologies	
and	the	creation	of	a	database	that	would	allow	for	the	coordination	of	State	forces	in	efforts	to	
fight	organized	crime,	with	a	special	focus	on	drug	trafficking	and	arms	smuggling.	
	
The	national	public	security	policy	was	assessed	to	lack	planning	and	management	capacity	due	
to	 fragmenting	 actions	 by	 several	 States	 in	 the	 area.	 The	 proposed	model	 therefore	 involved	
increasing	States’	understanding	of	the	actual	and	current	status	of	violence	and	crime,	in	order	
to	promote	preventive,	strategic	and	targeted	actions,	which	would	permanently	be	monitored	
by	actors	of	public	security	and	in	the	criminal	justice	system.	
	
The	actual	implementation	of	the	proposal,	however,	was	only	partially	carried	out.	Moreover,	
the	organizational	reforms	of	police	structures	was	completely	removed	from	the	agenda	with	
the	fall	of	the	National	Secretary	of	Public	Security	in	the	second	year	of	Lula's	term.	This	was	due	
to	pressure	from	groups	that	were	highly	involved	in	public	security	organizations,	particularly	
the	Federal	Police,	and	that	wanted	to	maintain	their	central	role	in	policy	coordination	in	the	
area.	
	
The	withdrawal	of	support	by	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	led	by	lawyer	Marcio	Tomaz	Bastos	from	
San	Paulo,	and	the	concomitant		fall	of	Luiz	Eduardo	Soares	who	was	in	charge	of	public	safety,	
meant	 that	 the	 development	 of	 knowledge,	 the	 structuring	 of	 research	 networks	 and	 the	
systematic	production	of	data	were	brought	to	a	halt.	However,	this	was	taken	into	account	only	
to	 a	 limited	 extent	when	 informing	 strategic	management.	 The	 first	 agreements	 between	 the	
Federal	Government	and	the	States	to	implement	prevention	programs	and	training	for	public	
safety	professionals	were	seen	as	verification	of	the	progress	of	prevention	policy.	Even	though	
the	 plan	 was	 still	 situated	 in	 the	 police	 schools,	 they	 received	 an	 important	 contribution	 to	
establish	the	National	Network	for	Advanced	Studies	in	Public	Safety	(RENAESP).	This	facilitated	
more	permanent	contact	between	police,	Brazilian	universities	and	other	safety	operator	in	order	
to	enable	consolidation	between,	or	creation	of,	several	research	groups	in	the	area.	
	
During	 the	 electoral	 process	 which	 led	 up	 to	 Lula’s	 second	 term,	 the	 development	 of	 the	
Government	 Security	 Plan	 was	 coordinated	 by	 sociologist	 José	 Vicente	 Tavares	 dos	 Santos.	
Tavares	dos	Santos	was	a	professor	and	researcher	at	the	Federal	University	of	Rio	Grande	do	Sul	
with	a	proven	track	record	in	the	field	of	public	safety	and	the	sociology	of	violence.	The	proposal	
finally	confronted	major	problems	such	as	the	question	of	obsolescence	of	the	State	Police;	the	
failure	of	the	penitential	model;	the	fragmentation	of	the	public	security	system;	the	low	success	
rate	of	State	agency	interventions	and	service	provision;	the	developing	instrumentalization	of	
police	intelligence;	the	lack	of	local	public	power	to	deal	with	the	topic;	and	the	lack	of	interaction	
and	 involvement	 in	 the	discussion,	 evaluation	and	development	of	public	policies	 in	 the	area.	
(Tavares	dos	Santos	2006).	
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The	proposal	was	articulated	around	the	concept	of	public	and	citizenry	safety,	with	initiatives	
aimed	 to	 strengthen	 State	 security	 and	 criminal	 justice	 institutions	 and,	 especially,	 dismantle	
organized	 crime	 in	 Brazilian	 territory.	 It	 was	 also	 aimed	 at	 stimulating	 new	 patterns	 of	
coexistence	between	people;	at	strengthening	and	improving	participation	in	democratization;	
and	at	promoting	human	rights;	while	at	the	same	time	developing	prevention	policies	to	counter	
crime	and	(physical	and	symbolic)	violence,	in	order	to	ensure	peace	as	a	fundamental	value	in	
Brazilian	 society.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 this,	 three	 basic	 policy	 guidelines	 were	 presented:	 first,	
democratization	and	participation	of	both	society	and	the	state	in	the	management	of	safety	in	an	
articulated	manner;	 second,	 the	 integration	of	 public	 security	 institutions;	 and	 third,	 defining	
public	security	policies	in	scientific	information	and	research	systems.	
	
The	 proposal	 was	 developed	 in	 2007	 following	 the	 broader	 trend	 of	 introducing	 State	
performance	into	the	area	of	public	safety,	which	had	begun	with	the	establishment	of	the	SENASP	
and	was	soon	followed	by	a	proposed	Single	Public	Security	System	(SUS).	It	was	developed	by	
the	Ministry	of	Justice,	which	was	led	at	the	time	by	Tarso	Genro,	a	lawyer	and	political	figure	in	
the	Workers	Party	who	had	been	twice	elected	as	the	mayor	of	the	city	of	Porto	Alegre	 in	Rio	
Grande	 do	 Sul.	 Genro	 launched	 the	 National	 Program	 for	 Public	 Security	 with	 Citizenship	
(PRONASCI)	with	the	use	of	the	previously	developed	plans,	at	the	same	time	bearing	in	mind	the	
complexity	of	the	phenomenon	of	violence,	and	with	greater	emphasis	on	the	socio‐cultural	roots	
and	 underlying	 dynamics	 of	 violence	 and	 criminality.	 The	 program	 proved	 to	 have	 an	
understanding	of	the	inherent	embeddedness	of	security	issues	within	other	social,	cultural	and	
environmental	factors	such	as	education,	health,	culture	and	infrastructure	services.	
	
The	 PRONASCI	was	 based	 on	 two	major	 principles:	 structural	measures	 and	 local	 programs.	
Among	 the	 first	 structural	 projects	 developed	 by	 PRONASCI	 were	 the	 improvement	 of	
professional	 public	 security	 and	 criminal	 justice	 system;	 the	 restructuring	 of	 the	 penitential	
system;	 and	 the	 combatting	 of	 police	 corruption	 and	 organized	 crime	 and	 the	 communities’	
involvement	in	it.	The	local	programs	that	are	worth	mentioning	are	Territory	of	Peace,	Women	
for	Peace,	the	PROTEJO	and	the	Community	Justice	programs.	In	return	access	to	justice	and	the	
recovery	 of	 public	 spaces	 were	 guaranteed	 through	 the	 revitalization	 and	 redevelopment	
measures.		
	
Despite	advances	in	the	design	of	the	plan	and	linking	the	proposals	and	programs	to	resources	
for	their	implementation,	the	results	were	quite	fragmented	and	dispersed.	The	reviews	showed	
that	there	were	issues	with	the	limited	room	to	question	the	proposed	solutions,	the	pure	and	
simple	 accession	 of	 the	 States	 involved,	 the	 lack	 of	 adequate	 mechanisms	 to	 monitor	 the	
implemented	 policies,	 and	 the	 abandoning	 of	 the	 planned	 structural	 reforms	 of	 public	 safety	
organizations.7	
	
In	 2011,	 Rousseff	 won	 the	 second	 round	 of	 presidential	 elections	 over	 Jose	 Serra,	 a	 PSDB	
candidate	with	conservative	views	on	administrative	management	who	also	spoke	out	in	favour	
of	moral	issues	such	as	the	criminalization	of	abortion	and	criminal	hardening.	Dilma	Rousseff	
subsequently	took	office	with	373	partnered	deputies	(against	111	for	the	opposition)	and	62	
senators	(against	18	for	the	opposition).	However	there	was	no	unity	in	political	programs	which	
made	it	difficult	to	carry	out	the	planned	reforms.		
	
The	 area	 of	 public	 safety	 did	 not	 receive	much	 attention	 during	 the	 election	 period	 and	 the	
National	Public	Security	Plan	was	not	even	formulated	and	released	until	Rousseff’s	second	year	
in	office.	When	it	did	appear,	it	turned	out	to	be	much	more	discreet	than	previous	proposals	and	
had	 been	 transformed	 from	 an	 integrated	 whole	 to	 a	 number	 of	 points	 to	 be	 implemented	
according	to	the	conveniences	of	the	partnering	State	governments.	Even	though	Dilma	Rousseff’s	
election	campaign	had	supported	proposals	on	public	security	issues	that	closely	resembled	those	
of	the	Lula	government,	the	fact	was	that,	once	elected,	the	plans	were	redirected	to	focus	on	other	
priorities.		
Rodrigo	Ghiringhelli	de	Azevedo,	Ana	Claudia	Cifali: Public	Security,	Criminal	Policy	and	Sentencing	in	Brazil,	2003‐2014 
	
IJCJ&SD							154	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(1)	
As	 president	 of	 the	 Republic	 Dilma	 Rousseff	 argued	 for	 a	more	 reluctant	 role	 of	 the	 Federal	
Government	in	public	safety	based	on	Article	144	of	the	Federal	Constitution,	which	attributed	
the	responsibility	of	Public	Safety	to	State	governments	with	the	use	of	civil	and	military	police.	
The	 PRONASCI	 was	 discontinued,	 due	 to	 the	withdrawal	 of	 Federal	 Government	 support	 for	
municipalities	to	implement	crime	prevention.	As	its	replacement	the	government	presented	the	
‘A	Safer	Brazil	Plan’,	which	was	never	implemented,	even	as	a	pilot	study	in	the	State	of	Alagoas	
where	homicide	rates	reached	92	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	2010.	Additionally,	resources	were	
redirected	towards	a	focus	on	border	control	policies,	by	establishing	partnerships	between	the	
armed	forces	and	State	Police	and	Federal	Police.	At	the	same	time	policies	were	prioritised	that	
assured	 the	 security	 conditions	 in	 the	 12	 State	 capitals	 during	 the	 2014	 FIFA	World	 Cup	 by	
developing	command	and	control	centres	coordinated	and	occupied	by	the	armed	forces	and	the	
Federal	and	State	Police.	
	
Incarceration	rates	and	penitential	policy	
Despite	 the	 simultaneous	 implementation	 of	 distributive	 policies,	 the	 increase	 of	 human	
development	 levels	 throughout	 the	 country,	 the	 reduction	 of	 social	 inequalities	 and	 the	
redirection	 of	 the	 official	 discourse	 of	 Federal	 Government	 security	 policies	 towards	 crime	
prevention,	it	is	noteworthy	to	mention	that	incarceration	rates	continued	to	increase	throughout	
the	analysed	period.		
	
Whereas	the	average	monthly	incarceration	in	1990	was	61	prisoners	per	100,000,	by	2014	this	
monthly	average	(to	July)	had	increased	to	300	prisoners	per	100,000	inhabitants.	As	shown	in	
Figure	3	this	growth	trend	was	virtually	uninterrupted	over	the	entire	period.		
	
	
Figure	3:	Growth	of	 incarceration	 rates	 in	Brazil,	12	month	average	 (per	100,000	 inhabitants),	
1990‐2014	
Source:	DEPEN	(2015)	
	
61.4
75.2 81.9 82.8
93.6104.0
116.2
137.1135.9136.8
172.2
184.8
159.7
206.7
225.8
239.4249.8
260.2266.6
279.6288.4
299.8
pe
r 1
00
,0
00
 in
ha
bit
an
ts
Rodrigo	Ghiringhelli	de	Azevedo,	Ana	Claudia	Cifali: Public	Security,	Criminal	Policy	and	Sentencing	in	Brazil,	2003‐2014 
	
IJCJ&SD							155	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(1)	
The	prison	population	from	1990	to	2014	in	absolute	numbers	as	measured	in	the	month	of	June	
grew	by	around	575	per	cent	(from	90	per	100,000	inhabitants	to	607	per	100,000	inhabitants)	
(Figure	4),	while	population	growth	over	the	same	period	was	only	slightly	greater	than	30	per	
cent.	
	
	
Figure	4:	Growth	of	incarceration	in	Brazil,	in	absolute	numbers	(per	100,000	inhabitants),	June	
1990‐June	2014		
Source:	DEPEN	(2015)	
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population	was	around	230,000	prisoners,	 incarceration	 rates	 started	 to	grow	significantly	 in	
absolute	 numbers.	 This	 increase	 of	 approximately	 8	 per	 cent	 per	 annum	 remained	 relatively	
consistent,	 reaching	 a	 total	 of	 574,000	 prisoners	 in	 June	 2013.	 By	 July	 2014	 the	 rates	 had	
increased	to	300	inmates	per	100,000	inhabitants.	These	rates	varied	greatly	by	State.	
	
Among	the	States	with	above	national	average	incarceration	rates	were:	Acre	with	521	inmates	
per	100,000	inhabitants;	Mato	Grosso	do	Sul	with	519;	São	Paulo	with	503;	Rondônia	with	495;	
and	the	Federal	District	with	476	inmates	per	100,000	 inhabitants	(Figure	5).	Conversely,	 the	
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in	the	number	of	provisional	prisoners	over	the	last	decade	proves	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	new	
law	relating	to	precautionary	measures	in	criminal	proceedings	(2011,	art.	12.403).	The	law	was	
devised	to	give	the	judiciary	a	series	of	new	possibilities	to	ensure	the	advancement	of	the	process	
without	the	need	to	imprison	the	accused.	One	of	these	measures	was	electronic	monitoring	of	
the	accused,	a	method	that	is	still	little	used	either	due	to	resistance	of	the	judges	or	due	to	the	
lack	of	available	State	structures.	
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Figure	5:	Incarceration	rates	in	Brazil	(per	100,000	inhabitants),	by	State,	June	2013	
Source:	DEPEN	(2015)	
	
Crime	against	property	is	the	number	one	type	of	crime	that	generates	imprisonment	in	Brazil,	
representing	49.1	per	cent	of	all	convictions	in	2012.	Crimes	included	in	this	category	are	simple	
and	aggravated	theft,	simple	and	aggravated	robbery,	larceny,	extortion,	extortion	by	kidnapping,	
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of	stolen	goods.	The	next	largest	group	of	prisoners	were	those	convicted	of	drug	related	crime,	
which	represented	25.3	per	cent	of	all	crimes	in	2012.	This	number	has	been	growing	since	the	
implementation	 of	 Law	 11.343/2006,	 which	 increased	 the	 minimum	 sentencing	 for	 drug	
trafficking‐related	offenses.	Beyond	the	 increased	sentencing,	 the	 law	had	an	unexpected	side	
effect	which	was	 the	 option	 to	 charge	 under	 drug	 trafficking	 situations	 that	were	 previously	
typified	as	personal	drug	use.	Because	Brazil	has	no	clearly	defined	criteria	 for	 the	amount	of	
drugs	 that	 represents	 personal	 use,	 it	 is	 the	 profile	 of	 the	 accused	 that	 gets	 weighted.	 This	
reinforces	the	selective	nature	of	the	system	and	contributes	to	the	overcrowding	of	the	prison	
system.	The	third	highest	ranked	type	of	crime	is	crimes	against	a	person,	accounting	for	11.9	per	
cent	 of	 all	 sentenced	 prisoners	 in	 2012.	 Crimes	 against	 a	 person	 include	 manslaughter,	
(premeditated)	 murder,	 kidnapping	 and	 false	 imprisonment.	 The	 so‐called	 crimes	 against	
customs,	which	include	rape,	violent	attempted	assault,	corruption	of	minors,	and	international	
and	domestic	human	trafficking,	accounted	for	3.9	per	cent	of	the	total.	Finally,	it	is	noteworthy	
to	comment	on	the	seemingly	high	percentage	of	prisoners	(5.6	per	cent)	convicted	of	crimes	
under	the	Statute	of	Disarmament,	such	as	illegal	possession	of	weapons.		
521
519
503
495
476
424
373
351
339
334
287
281
277
269
264
252
238
228
226
222
208
201
187
161
159
113
99
95
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Acre
Mato	Grosso	do	Sul
São	Paulo
Rondônia
Distrito	Federal
Espírito	Santo
Mato	Grosso
Pernambuco
Roraima
Amapá
Brasil
Santa	Catarina
Minas	Gerais
Rio	Grande	do	Sul
Paraná
Amazonas
Paraíba
Ceará
Rio	de	Janeiro
Sergipe
Tocantins
Goiás
Rio	Grande	do	Norte
Pará
Alagoas
Bahai
Maranhão
Piaui
Rodrigo	Ghiringhelli	de	Azevedo,	Ana	Claudia	Cifali: Public	Security,	Criminal	Policy	and	Sentencing	in	Brazil,	2003‐2014 
	
IJCJ&SD							157	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(1)	
	
Figure	6:	Number	prisoners	by	type	of	crime	in	Brazil	(for	crimes	with	high	incarceration	rates),	
2005‐2012	
Source:	DEPEN	(2015)	
	
According	to	the	data	by	DEPEN,	the	increasing	decision	to	opt	for	imprisonment	in	Brazil	(as	can	
be	 observed	 in	 Figure	 6)	 is	 linked	 to	 two	main	 discourses:	 the	 steady	 increase	 in	 preventive	
incarceration	and	the	increasing	criminalization	of	the	drug	market.	These	discourses	have	not	
been	accompanied	by	improved	prison	conditions,	which	in	turn	contribute	to	prison	violence,	
the	 spread	of	diseases	and	 the	growth	of	 criminal	organizations.	 In	2011,	 the	deficit	between	
number	of	available	places	and	actual	numbers	incarcerated	stood	at	175,841	places.	By	2012	
this	number	had	risen	to	211,741,	an	increase	of	20%	in	the	short	period	of	one	year,	to	a	national	
average	of	1.7	prisoners	per	place	available	in	the	prison	system.	In	some	States	the	situation	was	
even	more	acute	and	the	proportions	of	inmates	per	bed	reached	over	2,	as	in	Bahia	(2.2),	Rio	
Grande	do	Norte	 (2.3),	Amapá	 (2.4),	Pernambuco	 (2.5),	Amazonas	 (2.6)	 and	Alagoas	with	 the	
record	 of	 3.7	 prisoners	 per	 place.	With	no	 guarantees	 of	 places	 in	 the	prison	 system	and	 the	
growing	number	of	prisoners	each	year,	it	seems	clear	that	prisons	in	Brazil	end	up	assuming	a	
criminogenic	role.	The	prison	system	becomes	a	vehicle	by	which	crime	becomes	worth	the	risk	
and	 in	 which	 the	 State’s	 own	 performance	 is	 delegitimized.	 The	 responsibility	 for	 this	
phenomenon	can	be	shared	by	the	Federal	Government	and	State	governments,	which	have	the	
duty	to	guarantee	places	in	prisons,	and	by	the	Congress,	that	is	unable	to	advance	criminal	law	
reforms	and	define	a	more	rational	and	judiciary	criminal	policy.	Further,	delays	and	selective	
actions	end	up	worsening	the	high	provisional	imprisonment	rates.		
	
Where	are	Brazil’s	penal	policies	heading?		
The	current	Brazilian	public	 security	system,	which	was	developed	at	 the	start	of	 the	Federal	
Constitution	 in	 1988,	 established	 individual	 and	 collective	 security	 as	 a	 legal	 commitment.	
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military	 and	 civilian	 police	 dividing	 extensive	 policing	 and	 criminal	 investigation	 activities,	
strengthens	militarism	and	bureaucracy.	Both	concepts	are	characteristics	of	the	two	State	police	
forces	and	have	remained	unchanged.	As	a	result,	violence	and	corruption	remain	trademarks	of	
the	Brazilian	police.	The	external	mechanisms	of	control	to	manage	police	activity	are	ineffective	
in	 altering	 this	 picture.	 Additionally,	 criminal	 investigation	 is	 a	 highly	 inefficient	 and	
bureaucratised	process	with	a	low	success	rate	for	serious	cases	–	such	as	murder	–	as	a	result.	
Additionally,	the	judiciary	is	slow	and	inefficient	in	guaranteeing	due	process	for	vulnerable	social	
groups	 who	 often	 are	 the	 targets	 of	 police	 selectivity,	 which,	 despite	 the	 steady	 increase	 in	
incarceration	rates,	results	in	a	general	sense	of	impunity	in	Brazilian	society.	Prisons	therefore	
are	 overcrowded,	 dominated	 by	 criminal	 organizations,	 and	 largely	 occupied	 by	 provisional	
prisoners	and	young	drug	dealers.	
	
An	 enormous	 increase	 can	 be	 noted	 the	 incarceration	 rates	 over	 the	 last	 decade,	 which	 has	
brought	the	results	close	to	the	historically	high	mark	of	600,000	prisoners,	compared	to	a	prison	
population	of	around	150,000	inmates	in	the	late	1990s.	The	general	data	for	the	prison	system	
show	that	especially	preventive	detention	–	that	is,	people	who	are	in	prison	without	a	sentence	
–	 has	 increased	 and	 now	 accounts	 for	 40	 per	 cent	 of	 all	 prisoners	 in	 the	 country.	 Increased	
incarceration	 rates,	 resulting	 from	 a	 punitive	 demand	 supported	 by	 the	 parliament	 (primary	
targeting)	 through	 the	performance	 of	 public	 security	 and	 criminal	 justice	organs	 (secondary	
targeting),	 did	 not	 have	 the	 expected	 effect	 of	 decreased	 crime.	 This	 can	be	 explained	by	 the	
selective	nature	of	the	criminal	justice	system	which	only	attacks	the	lower	levels	of	the	criminal	
chain	and	imprisons	individuals	that	are	easy	prey	for	the	criminal	organizations	that	rule	the	
illegal	market	in	and	outside	of	prisons,	due	to	their	social	vulnerability	(Oliveira	and	Azevedo	
2012).	
	
Despite	 a	 growth	 in	 recent	 years	 of	 the	 number	 of	 cases	 against	 white‐collar	 criminals,	 the	
increase	has	not	produced	a	significant	change	in	the	profile	of	the	prison	population.	This	profile	
is	still	characterized	by	individuals	with	low	incomes	and	limited	education	and	who,	in	the	vast	
majority	 of	 cases,	 are	 imprisoned	 for	 crimes	 against	 property	 (theft)	 or	 for	 drug	 trafficking.	
Because	 they	 are	 within	 the	 penitentiary	 system,	 they	 will	 most	 likely	 become	 permanently	
ingrained	in	the	network	of	illegalities.	
	
It	is	important	to	analyse	the	diversity	and	ambiguity	of	current	governmental	policy.	According	
to	Matthews	(2013:	14):	‘there	are	mixed	messages	and	competing	imperatives	emanating	from	
official	sources’.	It	is	therefore	possible,	at	one	point,	to	be	talking	about	alternative	measures	and	
‘de‐incarceration’	 and,	 at	 another,	 about	more	 severe	measures	 to	 prevent	 impunity.	 Official	
criminology	thus	becomes	increasingly	dualistic,	polarized	and	ambivalent,	a	fact	that	does	not	
help	the	comprehensiveness	of	some	aspects	of	the	current	situation	of	newly	emerging	public	
policies	 that	 are	 distinct	 in	 their	 fundamental	 guidelines.	 Therefore,	 ‘it	 is	 not	 the	 exclusive	
punishing	that	is	the	defining	characteristic	of	this	period,	but	rather	the	ambivalence’	(Garland	
1999:	75).	
	
During	the	first	election	of	Luiz	Inacio	Lula	da	Silva	in	2002,	his	government’s	program	prioritised	
public	safety	and	advocated	a	greater	role	for	the	Federal	Government	to	reduce	violence.	Lula's	
candidacy	 represented	 a	 commitment	 to	 arms	 control	 policy,	 by	 focusing	 on	 combatting	 the	
impunity	 of	 crimes	 committed	 by	 criminal	 organizations,	 and	 against	 social	 movements	 and	
human	rights.	These	commitments	on	the	one	hand	encouraged	social	policies	that	would	allow	
for	 the	 reduction	 of	 inequalities	 and	 contribute	 to	 social	 pacification	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
would	improve	the	performance	of	public	security	organs,	especially	the	Federal	Police	but	also	
the	 State	 Police.	 These	 aims	would	 be	 carried	 out	with	 the	 use	 of	 new	 technologies	 and	 the	
creation	of	a	database	that	would	allow	for	the	coordination	of	efforts	to	fight	organized	crime,	
with	 a	 special	 focus	 on	 drug	 trafficking	 and	 arms	 smuggling.	 Based	 on	 the	diagnosis	 that	 the	
national	 public	 security	 policy	 lacked	 planning	 and	 management	 capacity	 –	 this	 due	 to	 the	
fragmentation	of	actions	by	the	States	in	the	field	–	the	proposed	model	involved	increasing	the	
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knowledge	on	 the	 reality	of	violence	and	crime.	The	aim	was	 to	 fuel	preventive,	 targeted	and	
strategic	 actions	 that	 were	 to	 be	 constantly	 monitored	 by	 actors	 in	 the	 public	 security	 and	
criminal	justice	system,	as	well	as	necessary	reforms	of	the	police	forces.	
	
The	implementation	of	the	proposal,	however,	occurred	only	in	part	and	the	issue	of	structural	
reforms	 of	 police	 organizations	was	 quickly	 removed	 from	 the	 agenda.	 However,	 there	were	
important	advances	in	knowledge	management	with	the	development	of	research	networks	and	
a	more	 systematic	production	of	 data,	which	 culminated	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	National	
System	 of	 Information	 for	 Public	 Security,	 Prisons,	 and	 Drugs	 (SINESP)	 during	 the	 Dilma	
government.	 But	 that	was	 hardly	 taken	 into	 account	when	 informing	 the	 originally	 proposed	
strategic	management.	Advances	 in	prevention	policies	were	assumed	on	the	basis	of	the	first	
agreements	 between	 the	 Federal	 Government	 and	 municipalities	 to	 implement	 prevention	
programs	and	training	for	public	safety	professionals.	Even	though	the	policies	were	still	centred	
in	police	schools	they	received	an	important	contribution	by	the	establishment	of	the	National	
Network	for	Advanced	Studies	in	Public	Safety	(RENAESP),	which	facilitated	a	more	permanent	
tie	between	the	police	and	other	public	safety	operators	and	Brazilian	universities.	
	
In	his	second	term,	and	now	with	Tarso	Genro	leading	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	Lula	implement	the	
National	Program	of	Security	and	Citizenship.	It	was	the	first	program	that	presented	a	clear	link	
between	the	budget	and	specific	State‐	and	municipality‐implemented	programs	that	addressed	
violence,	such	as	training	community	leaders,	youth	and	witness	protection,	community	justice	
programs	 focused	 on	 conflict	 mediation,	 and	 the	 expansion	 of	 mechanisms	 that	 addressed	
domestic	violence	against	women.	In	addition	the	program	sought	to	qualify	and	valorise	public	
safety	 officials	 through	 training	 courses,	 scholarships,	 equipment	 investments	 and	 the	
restructuring	of	the	police	force.		
	
As	a	result	of	this	attempt	to	implement	a	new	paradigm	for	the	reduction	of	violence	in	Brazil,	
the	government	mobilized	civil	society	to	carry	out	a	National	Public	Security	Conference	in	2009,	
seeking	to	source	and	build	social	support	that	was	necessary	to	implement	the	policy.	At	the	end	
of	Lula's	second	term,	 the	proposal	still	hadn’t	been	consolidated	and	much	had	to	happen	to	
structure	 a	 National	 Public	 Security	 System.	 But	 the	 innovative	 left‐wing	 approach	 left	 an	
important	mark	in	the	area,	laying	the	foundation	from	which	the	succeeding	government	could	
work,	and	even	the	difficult	fight	against	homicide	rates	had	a	partially	successful	outcome	with	
stabilizing	and	reducing	levels	in	the	early	2000s.		
	
In	 the	 following	 election,	when	Dilma	Rousseff	was	 launched	 as	 governmental	 candidate,	 the	
public	safety	issue	was	relegated	to	second	place	in	the	program	and	in	the	electoral	debate.	This	
occurred	largely	by	virtue	of	the	relative	success	achieved	in	the	previous	period	when	the	growth	
in	homicide	rates	had	stalled,	especially	in	the	South	East.	The	National	Plan	of	Public	Security,	
which	 wasn’t	 developed	 and	 released	 until	 Rousseff’s	 second	 year	 in	 office,	 was	much	more	
discreet	than	the	previous	disclosure.	Rather	than	an	implemented	approach,	the	plan	presented	
a	series	of	points	that	would	be	implemented	according	to	the	convenience	of	the	governments	
of	the	partnered	States.	
	
By	the	end	of	her	first	term	and	with	the	advent	of	a	new	electoral	dispute,	the	Dilma	government	
lacked	 favourable	 indicators	 in	 the	 area	 of	 security.	 This	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 regrowth	 of	
homicide	rates	and	the	government	followed	the	momentum	to	create	a	resurgence	of	the	law	
and	order	discourse,	 lowering	 the	age	of	 criminal	 responsibility,	 and	 increasing	penalties	and	
other	measures	linked	to	punitive	populism.	With	the	security	guarantee	during	the	2014	FIFA	
World	 Cup	 as	 her	 only	 success,	 the	 candidacy	 of	 Dilma	 returned	 to	 the	 proposed	 idea	 of	
institutionalized	 integrated	command	and	control	 centers,	 in	order	 to	 integrate	governmental	
and	State	action,	as	well	as	the	integration	of	civilian,	military	and	Federal	police	efforts.	
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If	Dilma’s	proposal	has	 the	merit	of	 recognizing	 the	need	 for	 the	effective	participation	of	 the	
Federal	Government	in	the	management	of	security,	one	must	recognize	that	little	changes	in	this	
regard.	 Accordingly,	 the	 implementation	 of	 effective	 control	 mechanisms	 of	 policing,	 police	
reforms	and	 the	necessary	 competence	 improvements	of	municipalities	 in	 this	 area	are	often	
being	omitted	from	proposals.	In	fact,	the	police	reform	proposal	might	even	counteract	and	end	
up	 reinforcing	 a	 logic	 that	 does	 not	 question	 the	 issue	 of	 police	 militarization	 but	 rather	
establishes	 a	 new	 model	 of	 police	 structures.	 Neither	 is	 the	 need	 to	 incorporate	 popular	
participation	 in	 security	 management	 promoted,	 an	 idea	 that	 developed	 in	 the	 Cabinets	 of	
Integrated	 Management	 which	 disseminated	 from	 PRONASCI.	 Finally,	 and	 perhaps	 most	
importantly,	 nothing	 is	 said	 about	 the	 necessary	 construction	 of	 alternative	 pathways	 to	 the	
hardening	of	criminal	law,	in	order	to	revise	drug	policy	and	implement	effective	mechanisms	to	
manage	everyday	conflicts	in	large	and	medium	urban	centers.	Conversely,	the	governments	that	
were	led	by	the	Workers	Party	left	a	significant	mark	on	attempts	to	address	the	punitive	culture	
and	reduction	of	violence	with	the	approval	of	the	Disarmament	Statute	in	2003.	This	fact	has	led	
them	to	be	the	subject,	even	today,	of	attacks	from	free	arms	trade	advocates	in	the	country,	who	
are	often	linked	to	the	arms	industry	and	the	punitive	discourse.	At	the	same	time,	the	Workers	
Party	 governments	 contributed	 to	 the	 passing	 of	 tougher	 laws	 to	 combat	 corruption	 and	
encouraged	crime	prevention	policies	by	the	States	and	municipalities.		
	
Additionally,	 the	 Dilma	 government	 passed	 an	 important	 legal	 reform	which	 allowed	 for	 the	
expansion	of	precautionary	alternatives	in	criminal	proceedings	in	an	attempt	to	reduce	the	use	
of	remand	imprisonment,	as	well	as	legislation	and	criminalization	of	the	use	of	torture	by	State	
agents.	
	
In	the	area	of	penal	reform,	during	the	Lula	government,	the	measure	that	was	definitely	of	an	
opposing	direction	was	undoubtedly	the	new	drug	law	in	2006.	The	parliamentary	debate	that	
led	to	the	adoption	of	the	new	law	showed	no	clear	perspective	on	the	role	of	the	criminalization	
of	 the	 drug	 market	 in	 the	 ‘hyper‐incarceration’	 nor	 an	 ability	 to	 develop	 a	 proposal	 that	
objectively	 distinguished	 between	 users	 and	 dealers.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 showed	 the	 limited	
capacity	of	left‐wing	Brazilian	politics	to	deal	with	this	issue	and	perhaps	therefore	fell	into	a	trap.	
In	return	for	the	decriminalization	of	personal	drug	use	–	which,	it	has	to	be	noted,	did	not	lead	
to	 incarceration	 before	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 new	 law	 –	 a	 reform	was	 adopted	 that	 hardened	
measures	against	small	drug	dealer	by	increasing	the	minimum	sentencing.	However,	the	reform	
lacked	any	objective	criteria	to	define	offenses,	leaving	the	fate	of	small	drug	dealers	up	to	the	
police	 and	 judges,	which	 led	 to	 increasingly	 overcrowded	Brazilian	 prisons,	 especially	 in	 São	
Paulo.	
	
To	understand	the	paradox	between	the	attempts	to	contain	punitive	power	but	at	the	same	time	
reduce	the	all‐time	high	incarceration	rates	that	played	out	at	a	federal	level	during	the	Lula	and	
Dilma	governments,	one	must	consider	the	weight	of	the	São	Paulo	State	in	these	results,	amongst	
other	factors.	Throughout	the	12	years	that	the	Federal	Government	had	a	political	orientation	
that	was	inspired	by	a	tradition	of	Latin	American	left‐wing	politics,	the	government	of	São	Paulo	
was	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 conservative	 PSDB	 party.	 This	 is	 a	 political	 party	 that,	 both	
discursively	and	 in	their	management	practices,	adopted	policies	related	to	the	 law	and	order	
movements,	which	argued	in	favour	of	harsh	imprisonment,	especially	for	drug‐related	crimes.	
This	resulted	in	the	discrepancy	of	incarceration	data	of	São	Paulo	compared	to	other	States	and	
reflects	the	orientation	of	the	Executive	Power	which	is	responsible	for	the	coordination	of	the	
civil	and	military	police.	
	
The	current	practices	of	police	forces	have	crossed	the	line	from	a	legality	that	is	considered	old‐
fashioned	and	inquisitorial	if	not	authoritarian,	to	a	type	of	‘practical	illegality’,	a	logic	justified	to	
improve	 efficiency.	 If	 criminal	 investigations	 become	 an	 obstacle,	 alternative	 practices	 are	
created	to	increase	efficiency,	in	order	to	deal	with	what	otherwise	would	be	an	overwhelming	
demand	for	police.	However,	this	‘efficient	illegality’	diminishes	the	guarantees	of	the	rights	of	the	
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accused	 and	has	not	 shown	 to	 increase	 the	 investigatory	 capacity	 of	 the	police.	Michel	Misse	
(2008)	 proposed	 the	 concept	 of	 criminal	 submission	 to	 address	 the	 phenomenon,	 which,	
although	not	new,	is	reinforced	by	contemporary	social	dynamics.	
	
To	 understand	 criminalization	 processes	 and	 the	 incarceration	 geography	 of	 Brazil,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	look	beyond	the	importance	of	the	provincial	State	governments	and	their	influence	
on	police	action	and	take	the	performance	of	the	other	two	other	punitive	control	agencies	into	
account:	the	Public	Ministry	and	the	Judiciary.	In	relation	to	the	Public	Prosecutors	Office,	which	
is	 in	 charge	 of	 criminal	 proceedings,	 investigations	 into	 the	 conceptions	 of	 criminal	 policy	
advocates	and	public	prosecutors	 (Azevedo	and	Vasconcellos	2012;	Azevedo	2005)	 indicate	a	
growing	identification	with	zero	tolerance	proposals	 for	crime	as	a	way	to	combat	high	crime	
rates.	The	current	inalienable	rights,	guided	by	the	idea	that	the	prosecution	cannot	violate	the	
constitutional	rights	of	the	accused,	has	fewer	and	fewer	supporters	within	the	institution.	
	
Entrusted	with	law	enforcement	and	the	prosecution	of	specific	cases,	judges	are	central	actors	
in	the	criminal	justice	system.	Magistrates	therefore	became	the	objects	of	study	with	respect	to	
the	content	and	reasons	for	their	decisions.	Research	on	professional	behaviour,	the	mentality	of	
judges	and	their	social	background	exposed	the	fallacy	of	the	myth	of	neutrality,	which	led	to	the	
opening	of	inquiries	into	the	real	motivations	of	judicial	decisions.	The	overall	findings	point	to	
the	 existence	 of	 a	 twofold	 of	 selective	 judicial	 activity.	 Firstly,	 there	 is	 a	 selectivity	 in	 law	
enforcement,	in	which	social	groups	that	are	economically	and	culturally	disadvantaged	are	more	
likely	 to	 be	 sentenced	 as	 opposed	 to	 favouritism	 for	 the	 upper	 classes.	 Secondly,	 there	 is	
selectivity	 in	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 law,	 in	 which	 judges	 use	 their	 discretionary	 power	 to	
benefit	their	political	and	ideological	options.	
	
For	a	number	of	reasons	–	including	the	various	corruption	scandals	that	occurred	over	the	last	
12	years	and	the	lack	of	a	clearer	direction	about	the	decarceration	program	which,	at	the	same	
time,	addressed	the	social	demand	for	the	reduction	of	violence	–	governments	led	by	the	Partido	
dos	 Trabalhadores	 (Workers	 Party)	 in	 Brazil	 were	 losing	 the	 ability	 to	 build	 an	 effective	
hegemony	around	public	security	in	relation	to	the	affirmation	of	rights	and	the	adequate	and	
Republican	functioning	of	the	government	organs	responsible	for	the	police	persecutions.	They	
also	lost	their	political	effect	on	other	areas	of	government,	such	as	the	States	and	municipalities,	
in	addition	to	other	institutional	dimensions,	such	as	the	legislative	and	judicial	powers.	These	
effects	are	crucial	in	order	to	be	able	to	change	the	direction	of	judicial	decisions	and	expand	a	
legal	system	that	is	able	to	restructure	law	enforcement	agencies	and	implement	effective	control	
mechanisms.	This	is	how	we	arrive	at	the	start	of	a	new	government,	still	with	a	leftist	perspective,	
but	with	a	continuous	and	uninterrupted	growth	in	incarceration	rates,	higher	levels	of	violent	
crime,	and	the	resurgence	of	the	law	and	order	movement,	which	threaten	the	few	achievements	
that	have	been	accomplished	and	throw	a	shadow	of	doubt	on	public	policy	in	criminal	matters	
in	Brazil	in	the	near	future.	
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1	Lawyer,	specialist	in	Penal	Sciences	and	with	a	Master’s	degree	in	Criminal	Science,	PUCRS	(Pontificia	Universidade	
Catolica	do	Rio	Grande	do	Sul,	Brasil);	received	a	scholarship	from	CAPES	for	the	academic	CNJ	program.	
2	This	article	was	originally	published	in	Spanish	(available	at	
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/gt/20160404115404/Postneoliberalismo_penalidad.pdf)	and	was	translated	
for	this	special	issue.	
3	For	systematic	and	stratified	study	of	the	evolution	of	homicide	rates	in	Brazil,	see	
<http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br/>./	
4	About	the	debate	in	relation	to	the	causes	for	the	reduction	in	homicides	in	São	Paulo	over	the	last	decade,	see	
Feltran	(2012)	and	Cerquiera	(2014).	
5	About	the	social	perception	of	the	justice	system,	see	the	recent	trimestral	researches	of	the	Fundação	Getúlio	
Vargas,	which	developed	the	ICJ.	–	Index	of	the	Confidence	in	the	Justice	system	is	available	on	
<http://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/icj‐brasil>.	
6	President	Dilma	was	impeached	and	removed	from	office	in	2016;	this	account,	however,	is	for	the	period	to	2014.	
7	For	an	evaluation	of	PRONASCI,	see	Azevedo	et	al.	(2013).		
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